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1. Introduction
The share of poor people in the global population has declined during recent
decades. According to Chen and Ravallion (2004), one-third of the popula-
tion of the world lived in poverty in 1981, whereas the share was 18 per cent
in 2001. The decline is largely due to rapid economic growth in population-
rich countries like China and India. There are, however, remarkable differ-
ences between countries and between regions in the developing world. Some
regions and countries, notably in East Asia, are rapidly catching up to indus-
trialized countries. Others, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, are lagging far
behind and the share of poor people in the population has even increased in
some countries.    
Industrial development has had an important role in the economic
growth of countries like China, the Republic of Korea (Korea), Taiwan
Province of China (Taiwan), and Indonesia. Along with accelerated growth,
poverty rates have declined in many countries. Some countries have managed
to achieve growth with equity, whereas in others inequality has remained
high. In this chapter, the growth stories of seven countries – China, India,
Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Mexico and Brazil – are described and discussed.
The main emphasis is on describing their growth processes and strategies, the
role of industrial development, the contribution of a range of policies to
growth performance, and the impact of growth on poverty and income
inequality. The study begins with a short theoretical discussion of the impact
of industrial development on growth and the impact of growth on poverty
and income inequality and then proceeds to the country examples. The final
section discusses the lessons learnt.   
2. The role of structural change in economic growth
The current understanding of economic growth is largely based on the neo-
classical growth model developed by Robert Solow (1956). In the Solow
model, capital accumulation is a major factor contributing to economic
growth. Productivity growth – measured as an increase in output per worker
– results from increases in the amount of capital per worker, or capital accu-
mulation (e.g. Fagerberg 1994). Capital deepening will continue until the
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economy reaches its steady state – a point at which net investments grow at
the same rate as the labour force and the capital-labour ratio remains con-
stant. The further the economy is below its steady state, the faster it should
grow (see e.g. Jones 1998). In the steady state, all per capita income growth
is due to exogenous technological change. The rate of technological process
is assumed to be constant and not impacted by economic incentives. Several
authors have found that capital and labour actually explain only a fraction of
output growth and that allowing for the quality of the labour force (human
capital) only partially reduces the unexplained growth – or Solow residual.  
Endogenous growth theory, initiated by Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas
(1988), focuses on explaining the Solow residual. Technological change
becomes endogenous to the model and is a result of the allocative choices of
economic agents (see Aghion and Howitt 1998, Veloso and Soto 2001).
Technological progress is driven by R&D activities which in turn are fuelled
by private firms’ aim to profit from inventions. Unlike other production
inputs, ideas and knowledge are nonrivalrous (see Romer 1990). Moreover,
new knowledge can augment the productivity of existing knowledge, yield-
ing increasing returns to scale. Because of this, the marginal productivity of
capital does not decline with increasing GDP per capita, and incomes need
not converge across countries. 
Technological change and innovations are essential sources of structural
change. In Schumpeter’s view, innovations lead to “creative destruction”, a
process whereby sectors and firms associated with old technologies decline
and new sectors and firms emerge and grow (see Verspagen, 2000). More
productive and profitable sectors and firms displace less productive and less
profitable ones and aggregate productivity in the economy increases.
Technological change is thus at the very centre of modern economic growth.
Based on the observation that, beginning with the Industrial Revolution,
technological change took place mainly in the manufacturing sector, authors
like Kaldor (1970) and Cornwall (1977) have asserted that the expansion of
this sector is a driving force for economic growth (see Verspagen, 2000).
Moreover, Cornwall (1976, 1977) saw technological change in certain man-
ufacturing sectors as a driving force for productivity growth in several other
sectors.1 Syrquin (1986) observes that, when overall growth accelerates, man-
ufacturing typically leads the way and grows faster than other sectors. At low
income levels, the share of manufacturing in GDP is, however, low and its
immediate contribution to aggregate growth minor. When manufacturing
increases its output share – often as a response to changes in domestic
demand and in comparative advantage – faster sectoral growth noticeably
raises the aggregate growth rates of output and labour productivity. 
In developed countries, research and development (R&D) activities are
the main driver of technological change. This is not, however, the only
mechanism of technological change. Firms and individual employees learn
by doing, increasing output and productivity even if technology or inputs
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remain unchanged (see e.g. Arrow 1962). As R&D activities in developing
countries are relatively limited and countries are far from the technological
frontier, international technology diffusion is essential for productivity
growth. International economic relations, especially international trade but
also foreign direct investment, are important channels of technology transfer
and increased productivity growth. However, technology diffusion can only
be efficient if the level of human resources is high enough, incentives for
technological improvement are strong, and institutions are relatively well-
functioning.
One of the driving forces for structural change is the change in domes-
tic and international demand. At relatively low income levels, individuals
spend a significant part of their income on food. As income rises, this share
tends to decline, whereas demand for manufactures rises. Similarly, as
income rises further, demand for manufactures increases at diminishing rates,
whereas demand for services rises rapidly. Changes in demand will also
change sectoral employment and output shares and impact the economy’s
labour productivity. Furthermore, trade has an impact on countries’ special-
ization patterns and on the rate of industrialization or structural change
within industries. Under an open trade regime, countries tend to specialize
in the production of commodities for which they have a comparative advan-
tage and import commodities which are relatively expensive to produce
domestically. Trade openness is also likely to bring foreign investment into
the country. This is often vital, and especially so at early stages of develop-
ment. It is also likely to increase productivity as domestic companies are fac-
ing external competition. 
However, the composition of foreign trade matters as well as the open-
ness of trade (e.g. Amable, 2000; also, Rodrik in this volume). Moreover, spe-
cialization in itself does not necessarily lead to higher growth rates. This is
most evident in the case of developing countries dependent on exports of pri-
mary products. As real international prices of non-oil commodities have
trended downward over time and are subject to sizeable short-term fluctua-
tions, specialization in primary production seldom promotes sustained eco-
nomic growth. 
3. Economic growth and the poor
Rapid economic growth is often essential for achieving a reduction in
absolute poverty. As growth may be associated with increased income
inequality, it does not automatically address the whole poverty problem. The
traditional economic development literature considered highly unequal
income and wealth distribution as a necessary condition for continued and
rapid economic growth. The basic economic argument to justify large
income inequalities was that high incomes (personal and corporate) were a
necessary condition for higher savings, which in turn were needed for invest-
ment and economic growth (Todaro, 1994). 
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The new political economy literature, on the other hand, links greater
inequality to lower future growth paths, and considers it an impediment to
poverty-reducing growth, as the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth
is found to decline when inequality increases (e.g. Nissanke and Thorbecke,
2004). The research in this area has not, however, been able to identify the
mechanisms through which this happens (Helpman, 2004). One possible
explanation is credit market failure, whereby the poor are unable to use
growth-promoting investment opportunities (in physical and human capi-
tal). The higher the proportion of credit-constrained people, the lower the
level of investment and the rate of growth are. High inequality, manifested
in a large proportion of population having poor health, nutrition, and edu-
cation, is also likely to impact on overall labour productivity and to cause
slower economic growth (Todaro, 1994). Raising income levels of the poor,
on the other hand, stimulates demand for domestic products and increases
employment and production. More equitable distribution of income may
also act as a material and psychological incentive to widespread public par-
ticipation in the development process (Todaro, 1994), whereas inequality
may cause political and economic instability. 
Even if there is no consensus on the proportion of the world’s popula-
tion living in absolute poverty, it is highly likely that the share of the poor in
the global population has declined during the last two decades (see e.g.
Wade, 2004).2 This is largely due to rapid economic growth in countries like
China and India. Differences between regions are, however, remarkable in
the developing world. Especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of poor
people [living on less than $1.08 a day (PPP)] significantly increased
between 1981 and 2001 (Chen and Ravallion, 2004). Inequality between
countries seems to have increased (e.g. Wade, 2004) . Evidence on that is,
however, somewhat controversial (as examples see e.g., Sala-i-Martin, 2002,
and Milanovic, 2002) and depends e.g. on the methods used, countries
included, timeframe and so on.  
During the 1950s and 1960s there was a widespread move towards
greater egalitarianism in many developing countries. Despite a decline, how-
ever, inequality remained high in many places because of the persistence of
the traditional causes of inequality like high land concentration, unequal
access to education and other public services, and the dominance of the min-
ing and plantation sectors (Cornia, 2005). During the past twenty five years,
inequality has been increasing again in many developing and developed
countries. In Latin America, income inequality increased in many countries
in the 1980s and also in the 1990s. Trend reversal also occurred in highly
successful East Asian countries – where inequality decreased between the late
1950s (or early 1960s) and the late 1970s and early 1980s – and in India and
China. Over the past 50 years, income inequality in China has followed a U-
shaped pattern with the turn-around point located around the mid-1980s.
Due to rapid economic growth there has, however, been a dramatic reduc-
299Industrial development and economic growth
tion in overall poverty in the 1981-2001 period. In India, the Gini coeffi-
cient of household consumption expenditure fell in the 1950s as a result of
the partial land reform and affirmative action in favour of low caste groups,
and stayed more or less at the same level until it rose in the 1990s during the
years of gradual liberalization and globalization (Cornia and Kiiski, 2001).
However, due to rapid growth India has also experienced a significant decline
in poverty since the 1980s.   
As the growth experiences of Taiwan and South Korea show, rapid eco-
nomic growth does not inevitably lead to increased inequality at the early
stages of development. Taiwan and South Korea have been able to combine
economic growth and industrialization with decreased inequality, even if
inequality has somewhat increased during recent years. However, some other
countries have been less successful. In Thailand, for instance, rapid growth
was accompanied by increased income inequality (e.g. Sarntisart, 2000). In
general, the impacts of inequality on growth and of growth on inequality
depend very much on national characteristics and initial levels of poverty and
inequality, but especially on the nature of the development process – how
growth is achieved, who participates, which sectors are given priority. The
choice is not so much between growth and equality, but about the type of
economic growth to be pursued (Todaro, 1994) and the policies to achieve
it. 
4. Impact of industrialization and trade on the poor
Industrialization is often essential for economic growth, and for long-run
poverty reduction. The pattern of industrialization, however, impacts
remarkably on how the poor benefit from growth. Pro-poor economic and
industrial policies focus on increasing the economic returns to the produc-
tive factors that the poor possess, e.g. raising returns to unskilled labour,
whereas policies promoting higher returns to capital and land tend to
increase inequality, unless they also include changes in existing patterns of
concentration of physical and human capital and of land ownership. Use of
capital-intensive methods instead of labour-intensive ones tends to increase
income disparities, as does the employment of skill-biased technologies, espe-
cially where the level of education is low and human capital concentrated.
Also, the location of industrial facilities has an impact on overall poverty
reduction and inequality. As enterprises are often concentrated in urban areas
– because of ready access to skilled labour force, better infrastructure, larger
markets and technological spillovers (e.g. Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001),
industrialization may increase inequality between urban and rural areas.
Promoting development of rural non-agricultural activities, like production
in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), may decrease this disparity. 
The degree of economic openness of a country can have an important
influence on its pattern of specialization and industrialization. If countries
are open to trade they should, according to Heckscher-Ohlin theory, special-
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ize in the production of commodities in which they have a comparative
advantage. In labour-abundant countries, trade liberalization would tend to
shift production from capital-intensive import substitutes towards labour-
intensive exportables. Due to this change, domestic inequality in those coun-
tries is expected to decline because of the increased demand for labour,
whereas inequality would increase in countries with an abundant endow-
ment of capital. Liberalization of foreign direct investment can also decrease
inequality in capital-importing countries, but that depends in part on the
degree of skill-bias of technologies employed by foreign invested firms. 
In several countries, trade and investment liberalization has, indeed,
decreased absolute poverty and sometimes also inequality. Bourguignon and
Morrison (1990), for example, analyze the determinants of inequality in 35
developing countries and conclude that the phased removal of trade protec-
tion in manufacturing reduces the income of the richest 20 per cent of the
population and increases the income of the poorest 60 per cent. Dollar and
Kraay (2004), who examined impacts of increased trade on growth and
inequality, found changes in growth rates to be highly correlated with
changes in trade volumes. No systematic relationship between changes in
trade volumes and changes in household income inequality was found, and
they conclude that on average greater globalization is a force for poverty
reduction. Still, the impact of trade liberalization is likely to vary between
countries, depending for instance on factor endowments, and liberalization
creates both winners and losers. Similarly to international trade, the impact
of foreign direct investments on income inequality is likely to vary between
countries. Any foreign direct investment (FDI)-inequality relation depends
e.g. on the sectoral composition of FDI, its impact on demand for unskilled
workers, the skill bias of technical change induced through FDI, and the
regional distribution of FDI (see e.g. Cornia, 2005). 
5. Industrialization, economic growth, poverty and inequality:
Country examples 
5.1 China
After World War II, China adopted a development strategy that included
deliberate insulation from the world economy, industrialization and eco-
nomic dominance of the state. As the country was falling far behind Western
countries, however, it began reforming its closed and centrally planned econ-
omy in 1978. Since reforms, growth has accelerated and in the 1980s and
1990s GDP growth rates were the highest in the world, 9.9 per cent and
10.3 per cent respectively, up from 6 per cent in the 1970s (World Bank,
2004a). Growth has been especially high in industry, the compound annual
growth rates being 11.3 per cent between 1980 and 2002, with services also
growing fast (10.4 per cent). The share of industry in GDP has increased
from 35 per cent in 1965 to 46 per cent in 2004 (World Bank 2006), where-
301Industrial development and economic growth
as the share of agriculture has declined from 38 per cent to 13 per cent
(Figure 1). At the same time, the ratio of exports of goods and services to
GDP has increased from 3 per cent in 1970 to 34 per cent in 2004 (World
Bank, 2006). Despite remarkable decline in the share of agricultural value
added in GDP, the decline in agriculture’s employment share has been much
more modest. In 2002, 44 per cent of the labour force still worked in agri-
culture (World Bank, 2006). Compared with employment profiles of mature
industrialized countries, China is still very much dependent on its agricultur-
al sector (Dutta, 2005). 
Between 1980 and 2001, the share of machinery and transport equip-
ment in manufacturing value added has somewhat increased, from 22 per
cent to 32 per cent (World Bank, 2006). The share of textiles and clothing
has been declining, and while the sector produced 18 per cent of manufac-
turing value added in 1980, it produced 12 per cent in 2001. While exports
of light industry manufactures like textiles are large and growing (Figure 2),
their relative importance has declined somewhat and that of more skill-
demanding manufactures has increased. In general, the volume of Chinese
exports significantly expanded during the 1990s, and the share of manufac-
tures in total merchandise exports also increased, exceeding 90 per cent in
2004  (World Bank, 2006). 
In its reforms, China has followed a model similar to that of other suc-
cessful East Asian countries. Growth has been based on rapid industrializa-
tion, increased trade openness and exports, and gradual liberalization of
financial markets. Growth has been import-export led: technology and
know-how have been imported from abroad and adapted to the domestic
resources, in particular to the abundant labour force (Dutta, 2005). This has
made the extensive production of export goods possible. The high domestic
savings rate coupled with large foreign direct investment inflows have made
massive investments in infrastructure possible. In addition, labour markets
have been increasingly deregulated, facilitating labour mobility. 
China’s reforms started in the late 1970s and early 1980s with agricul-
tural reform, which de-collectivized agricultural land and privatized land-use
rights. Investments in rural infrastructure were increased, mandatory deliv-
ery of output to the state by farmers was reduced, and farmers were enabled
to have a more market-oriented output mix (Ahya and Xie, 2004). Due to
reforms, agricultural growth averaged almost 10 per cent per year during
1980-1984 and 6.2 per cent per year in the 1980s as a whole (Ahya and Xie,
2004), decreasing poverty in rural areas. Successful reform in the agricultur-
al sector contributed substantially to reform and expansion of the manufac-
turing sector. Due to increased productivity in agriculture, surplus labour
became available to migrate to the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, due
to increased income, farmers were able to increase their expenditure on goods
and services produced by the domestic manufacturing sector (Dutta, 2005).
Industrial reforms started after agricultural reform with the opening up to
302 Industrial Development for the 21st Century
foreign investment and the establishment of township and village enterpris-
es. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, reforms focused on creating a pricing
system and market institutions, and also on reducing the state’s role in
resource allocation. Since then, the focus has been on banking sector reform
and state enterprise reform, which has included closing many unprofitable
state-owned factories.
Due to high economic growth, the share of people living in absolute
poverty has declined steeply during recent decades in China. The role of agri-
cultural growth has been very important in poverty reduction, far more
important during the 1980s and 1990s than growth in the secondary or ter-
tiary sectors (Ravallion and Chen, 2004). According to Ravallion and Chen
(2004), in the 20-year period after 1981, the proportion of population liv-
ing under the poverty line fell from 53 per cent to 8 per cent. World Bank
estimates, using one dollar a-day consumption as a measure of poverty, sug-
gest that between 1990 and 2000 the poverty rate fell from 33 per cent to 16
per cent. Poverty reduction has not, however, been smooth and half of the
decline took place in the early 1980s (Ravallion and Chen, 2004).  Poverty
reduction has also been more difficult in provinces that started the reform
period with high inequality (Ravallion and Chen, 2004). Furthermore,
despite poverty reduction at the national level, income inequality between
regions and between rural and urban areas is still high. 
After agricultural reform in the early 1980s, incomes tended to become
more equal across the country. In the mid-1980s, however, economic reform
favoured coastal cities with the development of special economic zones,
which increased inequality between regions. While eastern China has attract-
ed a remarkable amount of foreign direct investment and generated large
export flows (see e.g. Wan et al. 2004), the inland and western regions, dis-
advantaged by scarce skills, low agglomeration economies and expensive
transport, have fallen behind. Also, rural industrialization has been concen-
trated in eastern regions, which has increased inequality between rural areas.
Rural industrialization has also widened income disparities within rural areas
as labourers have become wealthier relative to those who have relied only on
the land. According to Ravallion and Chen (2004), inequality in general has
been increasing within rural and urban areas, and absolute inequality
between urban and rural areas has increased appreciably.  
China’s fast growth has been based on rapid industrialization, high sav-
ings, massive investment in infrastructure and productive capacity, an
increasingly deregulated labour market and an internationally open and
competitive economy.  The huge labour supply has made labour-intensive
production possible, which in turn has increased average income and
reduced poverty.  While the investment rate has been remarkable in China,
the efficiency with which capital is used is still low (Wolf, 2005). 
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5.2 India
The economic development strategy that India chose after the Second World
War was very similar to China’s – near autarky, industrialization and the
dominance of the state in the economy. Development was considered syn-
onymous with industrialization and industry was concentrating mainly on
basic goods like steel and machinery. Private capital was not seen as an effi-
cient motor for development, and it was considered to have a tendency
towards monopolization. Because of that, state control was considered to be
essential. The chosen development strategy was one of import substitution.
Development policies included licensing of industrial activity, the reservation
of key areas for state activity, controls over foreign direct investment, and
interventions in the labour market (Kaplinsky, 1997). 
As the chosen strategy turned out to be ineffective, bureaucratic and
conducive to rent-seeking behaviour, policy reforms were started in the
1980s, and some provisional moves to encourage capital-goods imports,
rationalize the tax system and relax industrial regulations were made. In the
1980s, however, reforms were less consistent than in China, and they only
became systematic and broader at the beginning of 1990s, following a severe
macroeconomic crisis. Acceleration of economic growth, however, started
already in the 1980s, and Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) and DeLong
(2001) consider the reforms and attitudinal changes of the 1980s as impor-
tant reasons for India’s current success. In the 1980s, the allocative role of the
state in India’s industrialization remained important, and only after the 1991
reforms did the driving force of resource allocation shift in favour of the mar-
ket. The reforms undertaken in 1991 and thereafter included relaxation of
the licensing system controlling internal production, currency devaluation,
relaxation of restrictions on the inflow of foreign capital and technology
transfer, abolition of quantitative restrictions on imports of raw materials,
intermediates and capital goods, reduced tariff levels, relaxation of rules
restricting large companies to expand existing units and construct new ones,
and simplification of exchange controls (Kaplinsky, 1997). Furthermore,
reforms included breaking public sector monopolies, reducing foreign cur-
rency debt dependence and tax reforms. However, most of the restrictive
labour legislation was left intact and, in addition, the agricultural sector was
left largely untouched. In general, the approach to liberalization in India has
differed from the standard, Washington consensus, approach. Liberalization
has been gradual and controlled, slow liberalization of trade and very grad-
ual privatization have been emphasized, and capital account liberalization has
been avoided thus far (Jha, 2002). 
During the past 40 years, the Indian economy has undergone remark-
able structural change. The share of agricultural value added in GDP has
more than halved between 1965 and 2005, from 45 per cent to 19 pre cent
(Figure 3). Despite structural changes, agriculture still accounts for a very
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high share of employment. At the same time, the expansion of services has
been sizable, with its share of GDP increasing from 35 per cent in 1965 to
54 per cent in 2005. In contrast to many rapidly growing developing coun-
tries (especially in East Asia), there have not been sizable changes in the share
of manufacturing (16 per cent in 2005 vs. 14 per cent in 1965). The share
of textiles and clothing in manufacturing value added decreased between
1965 and 2000 (from 25 per cent to 13 per cent) (World Bank, 2006). The
share of machinery and transport equipment was 19 per cent of manufactur-
ing value added in 2000 (roughly the same as in 1965) and the share of
chemicals was about the same (up from 10 per cent in 1965), with much of
the increase in the 1990s. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, GDP growth was moderately strong in India,
the compound annual growth rate being 5.8 per cent in the 1980s and 5.4
per cent in 1990-2002. Growth has been occurring mainly in manufactur-
ing and services. Between 1980 and 2002, the growth rate of manufacturing
value-added averaged 6.6 per cent  and that of services 7.1 per cent, while
agriculture grew at only 2.8 per cent per year. In the 1990s, growth was
remarkable in services. 
High growth has been accompanied by increasing trade flows. For exam-
ple, during the period 1991/92-2001/02, India’s gross trade flows almost
tripled, and the trade-GDP ratio increased from 21.3 per cent to 33.1 per
cent. Growth has been especially rapid in services exports, which grew by
275 per cent, whereas merchandise exports grew by 145 per cent (Kelkar,
2004). The share of manufactures in merchandise exports has been increas-
ing gradually but significantly. In 1962, manufactures made up 43 per cent
of merchandise exports, while in 2003 the share was already three-quarters.
Food exports comprised 11 per cent of merchandise exports in 2003 (World
Bank, 2006). Within manufactures exports, light industries have signifi-
cance, especially textiles and clothing. Gems (part of sub-category 66 in
Figure 4) are also important exports. Recently, India has developed signifi-
cant exports of chemicals, mostly drugs and dyes, and automotive compo-
nents (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005a). 
In addition to rapid GDP growth, a sharp reduction in growth volatili-
ty has been important for the Indian economy. In the 24 years after 1980,
the standard deviation of GDP growth has fallen to 1.9 per cent (Kelkar,
2004), one reason being the shift in the sectoral composition of output and
the decrease in the importance of agriculture. 
According to government estimates (presented e.g. in Srinivasan, 2004),
the proportion of poor people in the total population (using national pover-
ty lines) declined from 45.7 per cent in 1983 to 27.1 per cent in 1999–2000
in rural areas, and from 40.8 per cent to 23.6 per cent in urban areas. For
the country as a whole, poverty declined from 44.5 per cent to 26.1 per cent.
The widening of regional disparities has, however, been significant. After
reforms, per capita expenditure differences between states have increased,
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with already better-off states growing more rapidly than poorer states
(Deaton and Drèze, 2002). Southern and western states have been doing rel-
atively better, as they have been able to utilize the opportunities of globaliza-
tion and the market economy, whereas in some other states weaknesses in
human capital and governance have generated reduced growth rates in the
post-1990 period (Kelkar, 2004). Furthermore, rural-urban disparities of per
capita expenditure have risen (Deaton and Drèze, 2002), even if inequality
has increased faster within urban areas than in rural areas (see e.g. Deaton
and Drèze, 2002; Jha, 2002). Due to slow liberalization, however, changes in
inequality following reforms have been relatively modest in India compared
e.g. to transition economies (Jha, 2002). 
The impact of the reforms of the early 1990s on manufacturing firms
depended, inter alia, on their location and technological level. According to
Aghion et al. (2003), liberalization fostered innovation, profits and growth in
industries that were close to the technological frontier, while it reduced them
in industries that were far from the frontier. Also, pro-worker labour regula-
tions at state level discouraged innovation and growth in all industries and
this effect increased with liberalization (Aghion et al. 2003, 2006). Lall and
Chakravorty (2004) conclude that structural reforms have had different
impact on different states. In seeking efficient locations, private sector invest-
ments favoured existing industrial clusters and coastal districts, whereas state-
owned industry has been less oriented towards such locations (Lall and
Chakravorty, 2004). Due to reforms, the role of the state as industrial owner
and industrial location regulator has been substantially curtailed and the
dominance of private sector industrialization has increased, which is likely to
lead to higher inequality between regions. According to Mishra and Kumar
(2005), however, trade liberalization has decreased wage inequality in indus-
try. In sectors with large tariff reductions, wages increased relative to the
economy-wide average. Since the tariff reductions were relatively larger in
sectors with a higher proportion of unskilled workers and these sectors expe-
rienced an increase in relative wages, these unskilled workers experienced an
increase in income relative to skilled workers (Mishra and Kumar, 2005).
The sectoral composition of growth is likely to matter to the aggregate
rate of poverty reduction and changes in income inequality. Jha (2002) argues
that the rise of inequality during the years of rapid growth has been due to a
shift in earnings from labour to capital income, rapid growth of the services
sector, a decrease in the rate of labour absorption during the reform period,
and rapid growth of banking, financial institutions, insurance and real estate.
Real wages for agricultural labourers have grown at around 2.5 per cent per
year in the 1990s, whereas public sector salaries have grown at 5 per cent per
year (Deaton and Drèze, 2002), which is one of the reasons for increased
inequality between rural and urban areas. According to Ravallion and Datt
(1996), changes in poverty (during the period 1951-1991) have responded
more to rural than to urban economic growth. They also argue that primary
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and (informal) tertiary sector growth has had greater impact on poverty than
secondary sector growth. Over the long term, the secondary sector has not
been a significant source of poverty reduction (Ravallion, 2004). One reason
for that is likely to be high inequality in human resource endowments, pre-
venting the poor from participating in the non-farm formal sector (see e.g.
Ravallion, 2004), especially in the more skill demanding activities. As
absolute poverty in India is principally a rural problem, the greatest poverty
reduction can be attained by emphasizing rural development, in particular,
agricultural development. In some regions, however, poverty reduction is not
possible through investments in agriculture, and employment in manufactur-
ing or services is the only possible way to reduce poverty.  
The reform process has had clearly beneficial effects on the Indian econ-
omy. Growth rates have been high and growth more stable than earlier. The
service sector has expanded particularly rapidly, in terms of both output and
exports. Along with economic growth, poverty has significantly declined.
India’s economy, however, still confronts many obstacles hindering its
growth. Limiting factors for development have included:  an inefficient legal
system and extensive regulations like those of the labour market; a low sav-
ings rate which has limited capital formation; a minor role for FDI, especial-
ly when compared to China; lack of access to finance, especially for small
businesses; high tariff levels which restrict competition in domestic markets
and hinder the development of potential exporters.  
5.3 South Korea
Economic growth in South Korea has been rapid during the last 40-45 years.
During its rapid industrialization, the country was able to achieve remark-
able growth with steep reductions in poverty and inequality. In 1960-2002,
the compound annual GDP growth rate (CAGR) was 7.5 per cent. Growth
has been high especially in manufacturing. Between 1960 and 1969, the
CAGR of manufacturing value added was 16.5 per cent and between 1970
and 1979 it was 17.6 per cent. Growth in agriculture’s value-added has been
continuously declining, falling from 5.1 per cent in the 1960s to only 1.7 per
cent during 1990-2002. Rapid growth has been associated with significant
structural changes (Figure 5). In 1965, the share of manufacturing in GDP
was 14 per cent and that of agriculture 39 per cent. In 1977, the shares for
both sectors were around 24 per cent, and in 2004 they were 29 per cent and
4 per cent, respectively (World Bank, 2006). Employment in agriculture has
also declined. In 1980, 34 per cent of all employees (18 per cent in 1990)
still worked in agriculture; in 2003 the share was only 9 per cent (World
Bank, 2006). The industrial employment share has had an inverted U-shape
form during the last 25 years: in 2003 industry employed 28 per cent of
employees, compared with 37 per cent in 1991 and 29 per cent in 1980. The
share of employment in services has been continuously increasing during the
last decade, reaching 64 per cent in 2003.   
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In the late 1950s, the Korean government still pursued a relatively pro-
tectionist import substitution strategy. Imports were restricted by high tariffs
and import licensing systems. Most of the products exported were primary
products, and exports remained negligible (Lee 1997). In the early 1960s,
however, government policy shifted from import substitution towards export
orientation. Policies included trade reforms and export promotion, direct
export subsidies, tax exemption and low-interest export loans. Government
intervention was strong, and export targets were formulated in a detailed way
by product, market and exporting firm. Exporters also enjoyed duty-free
access to imports (Noland and Pack, 2003). Infant industries were protect-
ed. In general, however, successful export performance was likely to bring on
more favourable treatment by government. Export promoting policies were
highly successful, since during the 1962-73 period the share of exports in
GNP increased from 6 per cent to 30 per cent (Lee, 1997). At the same time,
the export structure changed dramatically, with the share of manufactures
exports in total merchandise exports increasing from 20 per cent to 84 per
cent. Within industrial products, the export of light manufactures, in which
Korea had a comparative advantage, was especially important in the 1960s.
In the 1970s, economic policy changed and massive investment programs
were introduced to promote heavy industries, like shipbuilding, steel and
chemicals. The aim was to change the export composition, reduce depend-
ence on low-wage sectors and sustain growth. Also, efforts at selective indus-
trial policies were intensified and, in contrast to the rule-based policies of the
1960s, greater policy discretion was introduced. This included an increase of
direct government control in the banking sector in order to channel funds to
preferred sectors, projects or firms (Noland and Pack, 2003). Priority indus-
tries also received tax incentives as well as trade protection. Basic metals and
chemical industry received a remarkable share of investments, whereas textile
and light industry benefited little from the policy shift (see e.g. Noland and
Pack, 2003). The impacts of this selective industrial policy can be seen in the
current export structure of Korea (Figure 6). During the recent years, exports
of labour-intensive goods like clothing have been in decline or stagnant. At
the same time, the sophistication of engineering exports has grown, and the
car industry has been evolving rapidly (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005b). 
With rapid economic growth, absolute poverty has decreased sharply in
Korea. Even as late as the 1960s, poverty was widespread, but in the late
1990s the share of population living on less than $1 a day (PPP) was only 2
per cent (World Bank, 2004a). Export-oriented industrialization, which gen-
erated rapid economic growth, has had a major role in the reduction. It cre-
ated high demand for labour and rapid expansion of employment, increasing
incomes and reducing poverty (World Bank, 2004b). At the outset, econom-
ic growth was heavily based on export of labour-intensive manufactures.
Subsequently, an increase of human capital has made possible the specializa-
tion on more sophisticated export items. It has also enabled productivity to
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rise, and increased innovative ability and adaptation of technology developed
elsewhere (see e.g. World Bank, 2004b), all of which have contributed to
continued high growth. Compared to many other developing countries,
investment in human resources has been extensive in Korea. Education has
provided avenues of upward social mobility3. 
In addition to growth based on industrialization, the land reform of the
late 1940s also contributed to the reduction of poverty, especially in rural
areas (see e.g. Henderson et al., 2002). Land reform facilitated a vast trans-
fer of arable land ownership to the peasantry. There were major improve-
ments in productivity (Henderson et al. 2002). An increase of agricultural
product prices in the late 1960s and the green revolution of the 1970s, as
well as government investments in rural development, all increased income
in rural areas and reduced rural poverty (World Bank, 2004b). The govern-
ment growth strategy, however, has laid emphasis on industrialization and
urbanization, which have led to more rapid growth of income in urban areas
and increasing income disparity between rural and urban areas.  
Poverty decline has been extremely rapid in Korea. After the rapid
improvements between 1960s and 1980s, the rate of decline has slowed
down (Henderson et al., 2002), but as of the beginning of the 1990s growth
was generally still highly pro-poor (see e.g. Kakwani and Pernia, 2000).
However, the change in income inequality has not been as impressive as the
decrease in poverty. According to Choo (1993), there was no significant
change in the size distribution of income between 1965 and 1990 (see also
Lee, 1997). On the other hand, Fields and Yoo (2000) argue that labour
income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, fell remarkably
between the late 1970s and early 1990s. Since the economic crisis of the late
1990s, inequality has been increasing. Compared to many Southeast Asian
countries, however, income distribution in Korea has been and still is dis-
tinctly more equitable. Government social welfare programs, which have
provided the poor with subsistence assistance and medical services, have been
one of the reasons for relatively low inequality. 
5.4 Taiwan Province of China
Like Korea, Taiwan has experienced rapid economic growth over the past
half century. The average annual growth rate during that period has been 8.4
per cent, reaching almost 10 per cent in the 1960s and 1970s (Liang and
Mei, 2005). Economic growth has been heavily based on the growth of man-
ufacturing, and from the 1960s onwards on export-orientation. At the out-
set, the country specialized in labour-intensive production and later shifted
towards capital-intensive and high-tech production. 
As in Korea, government intervention in Taiwan has also been remark-
able. In the 1950s, the development strategy was one of import substitution,
but in the 1960s, policy started to change towards export-orientation. Over
the years, and especially before the 1990s, government policies included
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extensive use of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on imports (especially in agri-
culture), selective credit policies favouring preferred sectors, a government-
led push for exports of manufactures, sectoral industrial policies to support
specific industries, and the promotion of state-owned firms (see e.g. Noland
and Pack, 2003). The government also set up special industrial parks, in
which several privileges, like duty free imports of materials, were provided for
occupant firms. Policies have also included the establishment of institutions
designed to identify, transfer, diffuse and absorb foreign industrial technolo-
gies and undertake innovation (Noland and Pack, 2003), in order to ease
Taiwan’s transfer to high-tech production. 
Taiwan’s post-war growth pattern has to a large extent been one of
growth with equity. Already in the 1950s, when rapid growth and industri-
alization were at the beginning, Taiwan had a much more equal income dis-
tribution than many other developing countries. Major land reforms intro-
duced after the war which reduced inequality and rural poverty are one of the
reasons. From the mid-1960s onwards, income inequality further declined
due to low inequality of wage income as a result of rapid growth of employ-
ment in export-driven, labour-intensive manufacturing industries. Demand
for all types of labour was at that time expanding, but demand for low-skill
workers was expanding at the fastest rate. Average wage rates rose and, as the
wages of low-educated workers were rising faster than higher educated ones,
wage differentials narrowed. In addition, due to improvements in education,
the supply of higher educated workers was relatively high, which decreased
marginal returns to education (Chu 1995, Kanbur 2000). However, in the
1980s the development of skill-intensive sectors pushed up wage inequality,
while the share of capital and property in total income increased. This was
linked to the increasing importance of larger private enterprises and escala-
tion of land values (Kanbur, 2000; Cornia and Kiiski, 2001). In general, eco-
nomic growth in Taiwan has been associated with even less income inequal-
ity than in Korea. In Korea, capital-intensive industries and large conglom-
erates were favoured over light industries, whereas in Taiwan SMEs have had
greater importance. 
5.5 Indonesia
From the late 1960s until the Asian economic crisis of 1997, economic
growth in Indonesia was very rapid, averaging 7 per cent per year (Hofman
et al., 2004). During that 30-year period, the country moved from a predom-
inantly agricultural production base to a more industrialized base – the share
of agriculture in GDP declined from 56 per cent in 1965 to 16 per cent in
1997, and the share of industry increased from 13 per cent to 44 per cent
(Figure 7). In the 1970s and 1980s, oil production had a high importance –
e.g., in 1980 the share of mining and quarrying (including crude oil) in GDP
was 25.7 per cent (Ishida, 2003). From the mid-1980s onwards, manufactur-
ing has been the driving force behind economic growth. Agriculture remains,
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however, a very important sector in terms of employment: in 2004 it
accounted for 43 per cent of total employment, whereas industry’s share was
13 per cent (World Bank, 2006). Rapid growth of the economy has benefit-
ed a large share of the population, as poverty fell from more than 70 per cent
in the mid-1960s to 11 per cent in 1996 (Hofman et al., 2004). The Asian
economic crisis in 1997, however, caused an increase in poverty rates. 
In the mid-1960s, Indonesia was still one of the least industrialized of the
large developing countries (Feridhanusetyawan, 2000), poverty was wide-
spread and society in economic and political chaos. In 1966, after a regime
change, thorough reforms were started. The first phase of economic liberaliza-
tion involved a shift away from a closed economy and heavily interventionist
policies to a more market oriented economy (Feridhanusetyawan, 2000).
Liberalization entailed the restoration of external stability, fiscal constraints,
restoration of the banking system, liberalization of the investment regime, and
agricultural support programs aiming especially at self-sufficiency in rice pro-
duction. Liberalization of the investment regime included incentives and
assurances to new foreign investors, and the return of previously nationalized
foreign-owned industrial and trading properties. Preferential treatment for
state enterprises was reduced. New investment laws provided the same incen-
tives to domestic and foreign investors. Export and import procedures were
simplified. Indonesia also moved to a unified, fully convertible fixed exchange
rate, which gave a boost to exports and foreign direct investment. Most of the
price controls were eliminated, and a balanced budget policy was adopted.
Restoration of the banking system included creation of a national central
bank, improved access to credit, authorized establishment of foreign bank
branches and of private domestic banks (Hofman et al. 2004). Chosen poli-
cies fostered broad-based industrial growth in the country (Hofman et al.
2004), but the liberal policy period did not last long. During the 1970s,
Indonesia experienced a rapid growth of income due to an increase of oil pro-
duction. Oil revenues made it possible for the government to finance capital-
intensive investments and engage directly in production, and there was less
need to rely on external sources of capital (Feridhanusetyawan, 2000).
Furthermore, the open door policy at the end of 1960s and beginning of the
1970s had already brought vital foreign investments to the country. As a
result, Indonesia reverted to a public sector-dominated economic strategy
emphasizing import substitution and public financing (Hofman et al., 2004).
State-owned banks provided subsidized credits to favoured clients, the state
was the owner of strategic capital-intensive industries, and barriers to imports
were erected (Feridhanusetyawan, 2000). State-owned factories operated
especially in such areas as oil refining, fertilizers, cement and basic metals.
Exports were mainly of oil and gas, mining and quarrying sector products –
e.g. in 1980, 70 per cent of Indonesian exports were products of this sector
(Ishida, 2003). However, once the oil boom ended at the beginning of the
1980s, the import-substituting pattern of industrialization, financed by oil
311Industrial development and economic growth
revenues, could not be sustained, and the government shifted towards an
export-promoting strategy. Indonesia moved from government-led growth to
greater private sector participation. A series of deregulation measures were
introduced to improve the investment climate. Trade reforms were intro-
duced, including exemption of export-oriented firms from all import duties
and regulations on imported inputs. Investment controls, including invest-
ment licensing, were relaxed. Also, financial sector reforms were started in the
early 1980s and major reforms were carried out at the end of the 1980s
(Hofman et al., 2004). Reforms eased restrictions on the opening of new pri-
vate banks, allowing e.g. foreign banks to open offices. Freedom for banks to
mobilize deposits in support of new lending was increased.
As a result of the improvement in the investment climate, foreign and
domestic direct investments started rising rapidly in the late 1980s (Hofman
et al., 2004), and exports of manufactures started to increase at a remarkable
rate (Figure 8). In 1980, the share of manufacturing exports in merchandise
exports was only 2.3 per cent, but by 1996 the share had expanded to 51.4
per cent. Oil-based exports remained important, however, with the share of
fuels in merchandise exports at the beginning of 2000s still amounting to
approximately one-fourth. Food exports are also of importance. Within the
category of manufacturing exports, the importance of resource-based manu-
factures diminished in the 1980s and, by the early 1990s, they had been
overtaken by low- and medium-technology manufactures (Aswicahyono and
Feridhanusetyawan, 2004). Since the mid-1990s, the share of low-tech prod-
uct exports has declined and that of medium and high-tech products
increased (see Aswicahyono and Feridhanusetyawan, 2004). This trend can
also be seen in the structure of manufacturing production, as the share of
machinery and transport equipment production in manufacturing value-
added increased from 13 per cent in 1980 to 22 per cent in 2002 (World
Bank, 2006). Over the same period, the share of the food sector (food, bev-
erages and tobacco) decreased from 32 per cent to 23 per cent (65 per cent
in 1970), while the share of textiles and clothing, which is also a low-tech
industry, has been relatively steady – between 15 per cent and 21 per cent
during the 1990s. 
Rapid and persistent economic growth, which continued until the late
1990s, had a significant impact on poverty. In the late 1960s a large part of
the population was still living in poverty, but in 1996 the share was only 11
per cent (Hofman et al. 2004; according to World Bank figures, the share was
15.7 per cent). From 1967 to 2002, the income of the bottom 20 per cent
of income earners grew at the same pace as the overall average per capita
income (Timmer, 2004), and growth was thus on average pro-poor during
that period, even if there was considerable variance between sub-periods.
Changes in inequality were relatively minor during the 1964-1996 period,
and the Gini coefficient fluctuated between 0.32 and 0.38 (see
Feridhanusetyawan, 2000).4 Investment of the oil rents in the financing of
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the green revolution caused a decline of inequality, especially in rural areas,
as employment and production opportunities increased in the rural sector
(Cornia and Kiiski, 2001). Oil revenues allowed large investments in infra-
structure, education and health, all of which also benefited the poor. The
period from the mid-1970s to the late-1980s can in particular be considered
a successful example of fast and equitable growth accompanied by rapid
poverty reduction. However, from the late 1980s until the economic crisis of
the late 1990s, during the period of rapid globalization, the development of
the urban-based manufacturing, financial and other sectors was emphasized,
and there was a slowdown in agricultural growth, which caused a widening
of the rural-urban gap and an increase of overall inequality (Cornia and
Kiiski, 2001). Rural development programs were also retrenched during that
period. As the overall growth was rapid, however, the poverty rate declined
during that period as well. 
Rapid economic growth has significantly decreased poverty in
Indonesia. Growth has been built on strong macroeconomic policies, sup-
port for agriculture, investment in physical and human capital, and increas-
ingly liberal policies in the financial sector, trade, and foreign investment
(Hofman et al., 2004). Rapid growth has tended to be based on labour-
intensive production; thus, growth has in general been pro-poor. As in
China, Taiwan or South Korea, development of and increased productivity
in the agricultural sector have contributed significantly to the reduction in
poverty. The oil boom of the 1970s caused a significant increase in export
income and made possible investments in infrastructure and public goods
that also benefited the poor. Following the oil boom, an increase of manu-
facturing exports has been the driving force of growth. Private sector manu-
facturing has been highly labour-intensive and sectors like textiles and cloth-
ing, wood processing, and the food industry have created employment
opportunities for the poor. 
5.6 Mexico
Compared to South Korea, Taiwan or China, Mexico’s economic develop-
ment has been far less noteworthy. Especially during the 1980s and 1990s,
the country experienced several economic crises. From the 1940s until the
mid-1980s, Mexico’s economic policy was based on import-substituting
industrialization (e.g. Esquivel and Rodríguez-López, 2003). The strategy
included high protective tariffs and other import barriers, especially to con-
sumer goods. Industrial expansion was promoted through public investment
in energy and transportation infrastructure. During those years, the Mexican
economy industrialized and the economy performed well. In the 1960s, for
example, GDP grew by 6.8 per cent per annum and industry also grew rap-
idly (7.9 per cent per year, 1965-1969). By 1970, Mexico had diversified its
export base – the share of manufactures in merchandise exports was already
32 per cent, while eight years earlier it had been less than half of that – and
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it was also self-sufficient in many consumer goods. Rapid economic growth
continued in the 1970s, but growth was undermined by fiscal mismanage-
ment and deterioration of the investment climate. Foreign borrowing
increased, and the public sector deficit rose rapidly. Also, inflation started to
rise. The poor investment climate led to massive capital flight. In general, the
macroeconomic policies of the 1970s left the economy vulnerable to exter-
nal shocks and, at the beginning of the 1980s, rising inflation, increasing
debt, falling oil prices and higher world interest rates caused an economic cri-
sis. The crisis forced the country to start economic reforms, and in the mid-
1980s economic policy was re-oriented toward trade liberalization, export
promotion and privatization. Trade barriers were reduced, Mexico joined the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and Mexico’s US debt was
re-scheduled. The economy stagnated, however, throughout the 1980s and
the growth of GDP was negative as late as 1986. By the end of the 1980s,
the inflation rate fell significantly and growth resumed. Trade liberalization
further progressed as Mexico joined the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. A new economic crisis occurred, however, in
1994-1995, and in 1995 GDP growth was significantly negative. With inter-
national support, growth recovered by the end of the 1990s before declining
again at the beginning of the next decade, when industry in particular stag-
nated. During the past few years, the country’s economic health has
improved and, compared to the period of the mid-1990s economic crisis, it
is more resilient to external shocks. Tighter monetary and fiscal policies have
dampened inflation: in 2002 consumer price inflation was 5 per cent, com-
pared to 69 per cent in the 1980s.   
The services sector is the largest contributor to Mexican GDP, account-
ing for 70 per cent in 2005 (Figure 9). The importance of the sector has
somewhat increased during recent decades, but it accounted for 59 per cent
of GDP already in the mid-1960s (World Bank, 2006). The contribution of
agriculture to GDP has been minor. In 1965, its share was 14 per cent and
the share has declined further since then – in 2005 it was only 4 per cent.
The agricultural sector is, however, still an important employer, absorbing 16
per cent of total employment in 2003, and in some regions significantly
more than that. The share of manufacturing has been relatively constant over
the years, accounting for 18 per cent of GDP in 2005. The importance of
manufacturing exports has, however, significantly increased. In the late
1970s and early 1980s, Mexico relied heavily on oil for foreign-exchange
earnings (in 1982 the share of fuels in merchandise exports was 77.2 per
cent), but since the mid-1980s, when trade liberalization started, the share of
manufacturing exports began to increase, and in 2004 they accounted for
approximately 80 per cent of total merchandise exports. 
The most important manufacturing sub-sectors in terms of output are
currently metal products, machinery and related equipment; food, beverages
and tobacco; and chemicals, petroleum products, rubber and plastics (see e.g.
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Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004). The first of these is also the most
important manufacturing export sector. During the last 15 years, the impor-
tance of some skill-intensive exports (including road vehicles, telecommuni-
cation equipment, and electrical machinery) has been increasing, as has the
share of some light industries (Figure 10). Among individual light industries,
the clothing and accessories sector is the most important, accounting for
more than one-fourth of total light industry export income in 2003. The
share of food and agricultural raw material exports in total merchandise
exports has been steadily declining, from more than 40 per cent of total mer-
chandise exports in the 1960s to 12 per cent in 1980 and 5 per cent in 2004
(World Bank, 2006). A remarkable part of Mexico’s production of manufac-
tures for export is currently occurring in maquiladoras (in-bond assembly for
re-export plants), which generally have a large content of imported inputs.
Poverty and inequality are still significant problems in Mexico. In 2002,
one-fifth of the population was living in poverty (measured using a food-
based poverty line, close to the international $2 per day poverty line) (World
Bank, 2004c). Over the past decade, the pattern of overall poverty has close-
ly followed the macroeconomic cycle and the changes in the labour market
(World Bank, 2004c). During the 1994-1995 crisis, poverty increased signif-
icantly, and it later declined with economic growth. The period 2000-2002
was exceptional, however, and poverty fell despite economic stagnation. 
Inequality is high in Mexico – the Gini index for the year 2000 was
54.6, while for India it was 32.5 (World Bank, 2004a). Wage inequality
increased between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s (see e.g. Cortez, 2001).
In manufacturing, according to Esquivel and Rodríguez-López (2003), wage
income inequality between skilled and unskilled workers increased substan-
tially between 1988 and 1996, after which it did not change much until
2000. Between 2000 and 2002, overall income inequality declined (World
Bank, 2004c). In addition to inequality between the skilled and unskilled
labour force, there are large differences across regions, and poverty is highest
in the southern parts of the country (e.g. World Bank, 2004c). 
There are several possible reasons that can explain why inequality increased
even if, according to standard factor-proportions trade theory, trade liberaliza-
tion could have been expected to reduce inequality in Mexico. According to
Esquivel and Rodríguez-López (2003), technological change was responsible for
the increase in manufacturing wage inequality in the late 1980s and 1990s. In
the absence of technological change, trade liberalization would have led to a
reduction in the wage gap, particularly in the pre-NAFTA period. Moreover, the
structure of effective protection before liberalization may have favoured
unskilled labour-intensive industries (e.g. Ros and Bouillon, 2002).
Furthermore, even if Mexico has an abundance of unskilled labour compared to
the United States (Mexico’s main trading partner), it does not necessarily
have it vis-à-vis the rest of the world (see e.g. Ros and Bouillon, 2002). 
Slow economic growth and high inequality have inhibited progress in
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poverty reduction (World Bank, 2004c). Manufacturing, which could be an
engine of growth, has been growing slowly in recent years. Exports have been
expanding, but a significant share of exports is produced in relatively skill-
demanding industries, which has decreased the possibilities of poor people to
participate. Nevertheless, during recent years, Mexico has made major
progress in some poverty dimensions, e.g. in health and education (World
Bank, 2004c). The progress in raising the monetary incomes of the poor has,
however, been slow, even if Mexico has slightly lower poverty rates than the
Latin American average.
5.7 Brazil
Similarly to many other Latin American countries, economic performance in
Brazil has been volatile. The contribution of the industrial sector (including
manufacturing, construction, mining and utilities) has, however, remained
relatively constant over the past three decades (Figure 11). In 2004, industry
comprised 34 per cent, agriculture 9 per cent and services 57 per cent of
GDP. 
Manufacturing, the single most important sub-sector of industry,
accounts for nearly two-thirds of industrial GDP. Within manufacturing, the
most important sub-sectors are food processing, basic metallurgy, machinery
and equipment, and chemical products. The production of motor vehicles,
aircraft, certain electronic products and machinery and equipment are world
class. Some of these industries are recipients of generous public incentives
(World Trade Organization, 2004). 
The contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP has been less than 10
per cent since the early seventies, but has increased by approximately 2 per-
centage points between 2001 and 2003, which reflects increased production
for some crops but also higher productivity (World Trade Organization,
2004). Despite a relatively small contribution to GDP, agriculture is still an
extremely important sector for Brazil, as it is a major source of export rev-
enues and an important employer (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005c). 
The share of services increased between the mid-1980s and late 1990s,
but declined somewhat after that. However, the sector still accounts for
about 60 per cent of GDP, and it is the most important employer, absorbing
approximately two-thirds of the labour force. The Brazilian government has
increasingly liberalized the services sector, particularly in telecommunica-
tions, financial services, and port and airport services. Public banks are still
important, but private participation, as well as foreign investment, has
increased over the years. Public administration is the most important sub-
sector, followed by real estate, finance, commerce and communications.
(World Trade Organization, 2004).
Exports have been a key factor in stimulating production in Brazil (UN
ECLAC, 2005a). The share of high-tech manufactures in total commodity
exports has increased (e.g. aircraft, from 1.8 per cent in 1990 to 3.5 per cent
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in 2004), as has the share of manufactures of intermediate technology (e.g.
passenger vehicles, from 5.0 per cent in 1990 to 8.3 per cent in 2004). The
share of low-technology manufactures, on the other hand, has decreased as a
result of increased exposure to competition from lower cost producers in Asia
(e.g. textiles, clothing and footwear, which in total accounted for 7.0 per cent
of total exports in 1990 and only 3.7 per cent in 2004). The share of primary
products, including agricultural and mining, plus processed goods of agricul-
tural origin, beverages and tobacco, and chemicals and fuels, remains high,
oscillating around 50 per cent of total exports (Figure 12). Increased
demand, especially from China, and strong prices in world markets have pos-
itively affected both mining and agricultural exports in recent years.
Brazil is a net exporter of agricultural products (primary and processed)
and mining products (including ores), whereas it is a net importer of other
industrial products and services (World Trade Organization, 2004).
Interestingly, whereas transnational companies account for approximately
half of Brazil’s merchandise exports, only a small portion is either medium or
high-tech – mostly automobiles and telecommunications equipment (UN
ECLAC, 2005b).
As a whole, industry accounts for approximately 50 per cent of total
commodity exports, machinery and transport equipment being the most
important sub-group. Within the latter, the automotive industry has been
especially dynamic. This has been partly a result of an aggressive export
development strategy, which included targeted support programs to the
automotive, shipbuilding and aircraft industries (World Trade Organization,
2004). 
The trade liberalization measures5 implemented by the Brazilian govern-
ment between 1988 and 1994 led to a substantial reduction of the average
rate of protection (Ferreira and Facchini, 2005). Whereas Brazil has become
increasingly more open to trade, as measured by the weight of external trade
flows in GDP, it is still – together with Argentina – below the regional aver-
age, as it was in the beginning of the 1980s6 (UN ECLAC, 2004a). In addi-
tion, contrary to most countries in the region, Brazil continues to impose
high effective tariffs on several manufactured goods, with those imposed on
motor vehicles, some food products (poultry, dairy, and vegetable oils), bev-
erages, apparel, and textiles being above average. Imports of primary agricul-
tural and mining products, of which Brazil is a very efficient producer, face
low effective tariffs (World Trade Organization, 2004). 
The manufacturing sectors that are relatively shielded from internation-
al competition, such as the motor vehicle industry, are also highly concen-
trated and represented by strong lobbies. Less concentrated sectors have not
been able to benefit from tariff protection, nor tax breaks or subsidies, to the
same extent. In the auto-parts sector, for instance, as tariffs rapidly decreased,
most Brazilian firms were closed or sold to foreign companies. In the context
of the MERCOSUR preferential trade arrangements, the motor vehicle
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industry and other well established, politically organized industries (e.g.
refrigerators, bicycles, audio and video equipment) were successful in main-
taining tariffs well above average (Ferreira and Facchini, 2005).
The industrial specialization pattern followed by Brazil and other
Southern Cone countries, based on capital-intensive industries, contributed
to exacerbate the negative effects of sluggish and volatile GDP growth on
employment and informality. While natural resource-based industries gener-
ate little new employment, labour-intensive sectors such as footwear, cloth-
ing and furniture have been displaced by foreign competition. For instance,
in Brazil, labour-intensive traditional industries’ share in total manufacturing
output fell from 36 per cent in 1970 to 26 per cent in 1996 (Cimoli and
Katz, 2002).7 This has led to increases in unemployment rates and informal
employment. Unemployment rose on average from 4.3 per cent in 1990 to
12.3 per cent in 2003.  Informal employment is estimated to have risen from
40.6 per cent in 1990 to 46 per cent in 2003.  Average wages of formal
employees in the industrial sector fell by 1 per cent annually between 1990
and 1999 and by 4.3 per cent between 2000 and 2003. Overall, increases in
unemployment and the expansion of the informal sector have worsened
income distribution, as wages are a significant source of household income
(almost two-thirds of household income on average in Brazil), and income
levels in the informal sector are substantially below those prevailing in the
formal one8 (UN ECLAC, 2004a).
Finally, poverty rates in Latin America in general remain above 1980 lev-
els despite improvements since 1990, and even with those improvements the
absolute number of people living in poverty has increased. In Brazil, poverty
reduction was significant especially in the 1990/1999 period, with poverty
rates, measured using national poverty lines, falling by 10 percentage points.
Since then, however, the poverty rate remained largely unchanged, at least
through the early 2000s (more recent data being unavailable) (UN ECLAC,
2004b).  
6. Discussion  
For the countries analyzed here, industrial development has been an impor-
tant basis for economic growth. Output expansion has been associated with
export promotion, increased trade opening, economic liberalization and an
improved business climate in most of the countries. However, import protec-
tion and selective government intervention have been employed as well. 
As poverty in many developing countries is a predominantly rural prob-
lem, increased agricultural productivity is often a key to poverty reduction at
the outset of economic development. This has been the case e.g. in China and
Indonesia. Countries that have started their economic reforms – as China did
– with agricultural reform or otherwise emphasized rural development have –
at the beginning – typically experienced declining inequality due to a decrease
of rural poverty. In Korea and Taiwan, due to land reforms of earlier decades,
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income distribution was relatively even when rapid industrialization began. In
Indonesia, oil rents were used in financing rural development. 
After the early stages of economic development, growth in the industrial
sector is, however, essential for sustained long-run growth and poverty reduc-
tion. In the countries studied, the growth of the manufacturing sector has cre-
ated employment opportunities outside agriculture and, as manufacturing in
many of these countries has been – at least at the beginning – intensive in
unskilled labour, the poor have benefited. In some countries, like Korea,
growth during certain periods has clearly been pro-poor, with the poor bene-
fiting proportionally more than the non-poor. There are, however, significant
differences between countries as far as the impact of industrialization on the
poor is concerned. In Mexico, for example, the growth of the manufacturing
sector in the late 1980s and early 1990s benefited skilled workers to a greater
extent than unskilled ones. Often, economic growth has been accompanied
by increasing inequality over some periods, even if poverty in absolute terms
has declined – as shown by the recent experience in China. 
The extent to which industrial development effectively decreases pover-
ty and inequality depends on the pattern of industrialization. Industries
which employ a high proportion of unskilled workers and/or use domestic
inputs and raw materials produced with labour-intensive technologies can
have positive effects on incomes of the poor. In Taiwan, for example, during
the early phases of industrial development, the demand for unskilled work-
ers increased relative to that for skilled workers, which reduced inequality
and poverty. At later stages, demand for skilled workers significantly
increased, along with a change in Taiwan’s export and manufacturing struc-
ture. By that time, Taiwan had made major investments in human capital, so
the effect on income distribution of changing skill demands was relatively
muted. The Republic of Korea has followed a similar path. In Brazil and
India, on the other hand, manufacturing has tended to be relatively capital
intensive, creating relatively modest employment opportunities for the poor.
Also in India, the service sector has been a major contributor to recent
growth, but the dynamic service industries like software and back-office pro-
cessing have provided few jobs for the unskilled directly. Still, with strong
growth performance for the past 15-20 years, the poverty rate in India has
significantly declined.  
The geographical location of industry can also affect the extent to which
industrialization is pro-poor. In China, industrialization has significantly
increased per capita income, but as industrial development has been concen-
trated in the eastern coastal regions of the country, inequality between
regions has increased and industrial development has contributed relatively
little to poverty reduction in much of the interior. Still, inter-regional labour
mobility is high and the remittances sent home by migrant workers can help
mitigate effects of geographic concentration of industry on regional inequal-
ity. Geographical reasons – or economic distances – also partly explain why
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some parts of Brazil, India, Indonesia or Mexico are much less developed
than other parts of those countries. 
Initial conditions significantly impact on whether major industrial
development occurs, and whether industrialization accelerates economic
growth and reduces poverty. Fundamental conditions for sustainable eco-
nomic growth and industrial development include political, social and
macroeconomic stability, well-functioning institutions and rule of law. The
role of government is essential in creating these. If these framework condi-
tions are lacking, investments – whether foreign or domestic – are likely to
be few and growth limited and fluctuating. Economic instability is likely to
impact especially the poor, as has happened e.g. in Mexico in the mid-1990s
and in Indonesia in the late 1990s. In Korea and Taiwan, on the other hand,
economic development has been much more stable. 
Government has an important role in infrastructure and human
resources development as well as in encouraging and supporting innovation
and technological upgrading. For poor people, education is often an avenue
to better employment and income opportunities. The existence of universal
education, as in China or Korea, gives the poor better possibilities to partic-
ipate in the development process. 
At the outset of their development, countries may rely on primary
resources or a cheap labour force, and all the countries analyzed here have
begun their development process by relying on one or both of these factors.
In the long run, however, investment in human capital and technological
upgrading are essential if a country wishes to remain internationally compet-
itive and sustain economic prosperity. Korea and Taiwan are good examples
of countries where human resources development has had a significant
impact on industrial development and broad economic growth. Due to rapid
technical change and globalization, competition is becoming more and more
intense, and the capacity to employ state-of-the-art technologies is increas-
ingly crucial to succeed. That capacity is above all a function of the educa-
tional attainment and skills level of the workforce.
Countries may choose to build their industrial capabilities through
domestic research and development as Taiwan and Korea did to a consider-
able extent. A more common approach has been to plug into global value
chains and become a supplier of labour-intensive products (UNIDO, 2002),
gradually upgrading technological capabilities through foreign investments.
This is the strategy used e.g. by Mexico and to a somewhat lesser extent by
Brazil. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and many countries
rely on a mix of technology imports and development of domestic technolo-
gies and technological capabilities, with the balance tending to shift towards
the latter as economic development proceeds. Governments have a signifi-
cant role in capability-building as well as in attracting FDI. 
All countries analyzed here have, at some point in time, carried out selec-
tive industrial policies, by which they have aimed to change the sectoral
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structure of production towards sectors believed to offer greater prospects for
faster productivity growth. Taiwan and especially Korea are examples of
export-manufacturing-oriented countries which have successfully used gov-
ernment intervention and import protection in the early phases of develop-
ment of their manufacturing sectors. 
Today, the degree of policy freedom left to developing countries is nar-
rower than it was some decades ago, even if some well-planned government
intervention may seem justified based on the success stories of the earlier
decades. However, governments still have a primary role in promoting sus-
tainable economic growth and especially poverty-reducing growth. In addi-
tion to ensuring stability, well-functioning institutions and appropriate leg-
islation (e.g. labour laws), other essential government actions are related to
skills formation, technology support, innovation financing, infrastructure
development, and provision of a variety of public goods. All these have an
impact on the growth and trade performance of a country. Rapid economic
growth as such tends to decrease poverty. Rapid growth may increase income
inequality, but this is not inevitable. Whether or not it does, depends not
only on the skill bias of technical change in an economy but on human cap-
ital formation measures and on the nature of taxation and expenditure poli-
cies. In addition to promotion of job creating industries and SMEs and sup-
porting the creation of domestic linkages, inequality can be decreased e.g. by
subsidized access to education, subsidized housing, progressive taxation or
economic asset redistribution like land reforms. 
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Figure 2. China: export of commodities, 1992-2003
Source: World Bank (2006).
Source: UN Comtrade database. Obs.: re-exports included.
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Figure 3. Sectoral shares of GDP in India, 1965-2005
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Figure 4. India: Export of commodities, 1988-2003
Source: World Bank (2006).
Source: UN Comtrade database. Obs.: re-exports included.
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Figure 5. Sectoral shares of GDP in South Korea, 1965-2004
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Figure 6. South Korea: Export of commodities, 1988-2003
Source: World Bank (2006).
Source: UN Comtrade database). Obs.: re-exports included.
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Figure 7. Sectoral shares of GDP in Indonesia, 1965-2005
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Figure 8. Indonesia: export of commodities, 1989-2004
Source: World Bank (2006).
Source: UN Comtrade database. Obs.: re-exports included.
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Figure 9. Sectoral shares of GDP in Mexico, 1965-2005
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Figure 10. Mexico: export of commodities, 1989-2003
Source: World Bank (2006).
Source: UN Comtrade database. Obs.: re-exports included
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Figure 11. Sectoral shares of GDP in Brazil, 1970-2003
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Figure 12. Brazil: export of commodities, 1989-2004
Source: UN National accounts database.
Source: UN Comtrade database. Obs.: re-exports included.
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Notes
1 It is important to notice, however, that technological change is not only relevant to
manufacturing, but similarly has significant impacts in other sectors of the economy.
A good example of this is increased productivity in agriculture, which has been essen-
tial for accelerated economic growth in many developing countries. 
2 According to some analysts, the distribution of income among all people in the world
has become more equal over the last two decades.  
3 It has also had negative impacts on income distribution. During the 1970s, for
instance, demand for skilled workers in heavy and chemical industries pushed up
domestic wages and increased wage differentials between skilled and unskilled work-
ers.
4 The validity of official inequality measures has been questioned, however. 
5 These included reduction in tariff levels, tariff dispersion and elimination of major
non-tariff restrictions.
6 Mexico is on the other extreme, having increased its openness to trade five times
between the early eighties and the first years of the current decade.
7 Job creation has shifted towards the private services sector, in both highly remunerat-
ed activities (financial services, telecommunications, etc.) and activities with low bar-
riers to entry, such as informal commerce and personal services (UN ECLAC,
2004a).
8 In 2000, income levels in the informal sector were 72 per cent lower than those pre-
vailing in the formal sector on average in the region, up from a 59 per cent differen-
tial in 1990.
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